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NOTES AND COMMENTS
coastal state, do not possess the status of islands. They
have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence
does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea of the
coastal state.
4. Due notice must be given of any such installations con-
structed, and permanent means for giving warning of their
presence must be maintained.
5. Neither the installations themselves, nor the said safety
zones around them may be established in narrow channels
or where interference may be caused in recognized sea lanes
essential to international navigation.
Precepts of International Law ultimately depend upon international
acceptance, be it expressed or implied. Without this acceptance, no Jus
Gentium exists.5 3 Which type of unilateral claims, those asserted by the
Truman Proclamation or those asserted by the Argentina Declaration,
will become established principles of international law, only the future
:an tell. Yet the direction of this acceptance cannot be doubted today.
Free navigation-juris et de jure!
H. WALLACE ROBERTS.
Libel-Multi-State Defamation-Place of Commission of Tort
In recent years courts throughout the country have often been faced
with the problems of multi-state defamation arising from national dis-
tribution of books and periodicals and from the wide coverage of radio
and television programs. Yet, there has been almost a complete judicial
reluctance to face these problems squarely. Many courts have failed to
discuss the issue when it was obviously present.' In some cases the scope
of recovery was not clearly set out ;2 and, even where the issue was cor-
rectly presented, courts have on occasion applied the law of the forum
" "International law consists in certain rules of conduct which modern civilized
states regard as being binding on them in their relations with one another with a
force comparable in nature and degree to the binding the conscientious person to
obey the laws of his country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by
appropriate means in case of infringement." HALL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1.
"What is internationlaw law? It is the body of principles and rules which civil-
ized States consider as binding upon them in their mutual relations. It rests upon
the consent of Sovereign States." Hughes, The World Court as a Going Concern,
16 A. B. A. J. 151 at 153 (1930).
' Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1944);
Wright v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944); Backus
v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
2Brinkley v. Fishbein, 110 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 672
(1940) ; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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without much discussion of the matter.3 A few decisions have met the
problem squarely, and in these the results differ. 4
One of the underlying problems is in attempting to apply the sub-
stantive law of one jurisdiction when the tort is committed in several
different jurisdictions. As many as ten different choices of law have
been suggested. These will be merely mentioned and the relative merits
of each will not be discussed.
1. The law of the state of the publisher's domicile or incorporation.5
2. The law of the state where the defendant's main publishing office
is locatedY
3. The law of the state of plaintiff's domicile, on the theory that the
harm to plaintiff is centered there.
7
4. The law of the state of plaintiff's principal business.8
5. The law of the state where the defamation is principally circulated.
6. The law of the state where the plaintiff actually suffered the greatest
harm from the defamation. 10
7. The law of the state where the defendant's physical acts originating
the alleged defamation occurred; that is, the state where a magazine,
book or newspaper was printed or a radio or television broadcast
made.-"
8. The law of the state where the damaging statement was first seen or
heard by anyone.
12
Spanei v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., 161 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947); Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
48 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1942) ; Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107
N. E. 2d 485 (1952) ; Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182,
8 A. 2d 302 (1939).
'Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F. 2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Hartmann v.
Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948);
Sidis v. F.-R. Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S.
711 (1940) ; Dale System Inc., v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745
(S. D. N. Y. 1952) ; Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp. 936 (D. D. C. 1951) ; O'Reilly
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940) ; Schumann v. Loew's,
Inc., 199 Misc. 38, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Notes, 43 ILL. L. REV. 556, 560 (1948) ; 35 VA. L. REV. 627, 633 (1949).
'2 Rabel, THE CoNFLcr OF LAWS: A COMPAaTVE STUDY 323, 335 (1947);
Notes, 10 LA. L. REv. 339 (1950) ; 16 U. oF CI. L. REv. 164, 168 (1948).
'Notes, 60 HARv. L. R1v. 941, 947 (1947); 35 VA. L. REv. 627, 636 (1949).
'Lefler, The Single Publication Rule, 25 RocxY MTN. L. REV. 263, 270 (1953);
Comment, 10 LA. L. Ray. 339, 345 (1950).
'Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" it 48 Pieces Versus Uniform Right of Privacy, 32
MINN. L. Rv. 734, 761 (1948).
" Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949), 63 HAzv. L.
REV. 1272 (1950), 34 MINN. L. REv. 332 (1950), 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 165
(1950), 24 So. CALIF. L. REV. 103 (1950); Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Publishing
Co., 161 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 766 (1947).
"x Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19
TUL. L. REv. 4, 30 (1944) ; Comments, 60 HARV. L. Ray. 941, 946 (1947) ; 35 VA.
L. REv. 627, 634 (1949)."Banks v. King Features, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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9. The law of the state which the merits of the case suggest, without
any rule of thumb as to what law governs.13
10. The law of the forum.1
4
There is at least some authority to sustain each of the above choices,
which serves to indicate the divergent views that exist concerning this
complicated problem.
Another problem that arises stems from the rule of Brunswick v.
Harmer,1 5 which is still technically the majority rule in America.:'
Under this view, a new tort occurs each time libelous matter is read by a
third person, and a different suit can be brought to collect for each sep-
arate cause of action. An opposing judicial effort aimed at reducing
multiplicity of suits is the "single publication" rule. There is no general
agreement as to what the rule is,1 7 but the underlying rationale is that
there can be but one publication' 8 of libelous matter within the jurisdic-
tion adopting the rule. All the economic steps' 9 leading to the publish-
ing of the magazine, book, or newspaper are considered as a single
process, and as regards that jurisdiction there can be but one cause of
action against any one defendant.20 The extent of the circulation will
weigh heavily in determining the amount of damages but the tort is con-
summated as of the first communication to a third person,21 and the
statute of limitations begins to run as of that time.
22
This rule is rapidly finding favor throughout the country,23 but even
1863 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1274 (1950).
14 Ludwig, supra note 9, at 760.
2514 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
"- This rule has been adopted by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT,
TORTs § 578, comment b (1938).
"- The rule has a double aspect; it sets a time for the statute of limitations to
begin running, and defines the actual place of the tort for venue purposes. The
rule is judicial in origin and was created mainly for the purpose of giving substance
to the statute of limitations, which had little effect under the traditional rule.
18 Publication is a technical concept involving an issue of historical fact; that
is, a communication to a third person. McGlue v. Weekly Publication, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946) ; Stella v. James J. Farley Ass'n, Inc., 204 Misc. 998,
122 N. Y. S. 2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 873, 135 N. Y. S. 2d
234 (1st Dep't 1954).
" The composition, printing, and distribution of a magazine or newspaper when
completed is taken as the one act of publication. Winrod v. McFadden Publica-
tions, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill. 1945), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 180 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U. S. 814 (1951).
20 The rule does not preclude suits against several different defendants who
publish the libel successively, such as two or more separate newspapers or a radio
company and a newspaper.
21See Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill.
1945), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 814 (1951) ; Age-
Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921) ; O'Malley v.
Statesman Printing Co., 60 Idaho 326, 91 P. 2d 357 (1939).
22 See Winrod v. McFadden Publications, supra note 21; Cannon v. Time, Inc.,
39 F. Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25
F. Supp. 993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
2 See, e.g., Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500 (M. D. Pa. 1951);
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if every state should adopt the rule there would still be difficult choice
of law problems. It would seem that the rule in each state would at
best curtail the causes of action only within that particular jurisdic-
tion24 because a state law cannot have extraterritorial effect ;25 it cannot
of itself cross state lines to bar action in another state. It has been
suggested that it would depend on how a plaintiff phrased his complaint
in determining whether the first suit was res judicatac as to any subse-
quent action.26 If the complaint embraced all causes of action in every
jurisdiction the plaintiff has exhausted his remedies in one suit. How-
ever, if he seeks damages only within that particular jurisdiction, he ap-
parently is free to go elsewhere and sue the defendant in other juris-
dictions.27 The possibility of such multiple suits is illustrated by the
Oakley and Sweeney cases.
2 8
Kelly v Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948) ; Hartmann v. Time, Inc.,
166 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948) ; Backus v. Look,
Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660
(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708
(1948); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d
640 (4th Dep't 1938).
" See O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D. Mass. 1940):
"The publication in each of the 38 states give rise to separate causes of action. The
defendant's liability for the libel published in each state is governed by the laws
of that state."
Why does circulation of libel in a new state give a new cause of action when
circulation in new counties within a state does not? Dean Prosser suggests that
the various states realize they are getting into deep water when they say a cause of
action exists in one state only, because each state has its own law and some of them
may recognize the existence of the cause of action whereas others do not. Prosser,
Interstate Publication, 51 MiC. L. REv. 959, 965 (1953).
See 11 Am. Jua., Conflict of Laws § 10, n. 5 (1937) for a collection of cases.
_6 See Note, 43 ILL. L. REV. 556 (1948). Generally, a cause of action for a
- tort is transitory in nature, and can be sued on wherever the tortfeasor can be
found. Collins v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 226 Ala. 659, 148 So. 133
(1933); Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459 (1929); Johnston v. Mac-
Fadden Newspaper Corp., 238 App. Div. 68, 263 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1st Dep't 1933).
However, some torts such as trespass are local in nature and suit must be brought
at the place the tort was committed. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660, No.
8,411 (C. C. D. Va. 1811).
2'Of course the plaintiff can do this only if he can get jurisdiction over the
defendant in the various states.
2 Annie Oakley once brought fifty different suits for being labeled a dope addict.
She recovered judgments in forty-eight of the fifty for amounts ranging from
$500 to $27,500. See EARNST & LINDEY, HOLD YouR TONGUE 190 (1950). A typical
case was Butler v. Hoboken Printing and Publishing Co., 73 N. J. L. 45, 62 Att.
272 (1905).
Congressman Martin Sweeney of Ohio brought sixty-eight suits for an alleged
libel printed in a nationally syndicated column. At least fifteen of these cases are
reported on the appellate level: See Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals
for Reform, 33 MINN. L. REv. 609, 627, n. 79 (1949) for a listing of some of these
cases. An example is Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F. 2d
288 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd without opinion by evenly divided court, 316 U. S. 642
(1942).
In both of the above situations the defendants were separate newspapers through-
out the country and therefore they have little relation to the single publication rule




The Commission on Uniform State Laws has proposed a Uniform
Single Publication Act which has thus far been adopted by six states.2 9
The act contemplates a single cause of action which will include recovery
for damages incurred in all jurisdictions where the tort occurred so that
the judgment will be res judicata as to any other action on the same
tort. There is no doubt that the act has merit, but it would seem that
in order for it to be fully effective it is necessary that all states adopt
it. Experience has demonstrated the reluctance of many states to adopt
uniform laws in the past, and there is no foreseeable reason why this re-
luctance would be discarded in the case of this particular act.
Suggestions have been made that federal legislation be enacted to
unify the law in this area.30 It is settled that Congress has the power to
regulate tort liability which affects interstate commerce,31 and there are
probably no constitutional barriers to legislation by Congress in the area
of multi-state defamation.3 2  The propriety of upsetting the established
substantive law of each state would be questionable, but federal legisla-
tion which would simply limit the causes of action and formulate a choice
of law rule would seem to have merit. It is true that some instances of
interstate defamation are so related to a particular jurisdiction that it
has a significant interest in applying its own law, but this would seem
almost to be the exception rather than the rule in this day when defima-
tion if interstate at all, is so often spread throughout the country thus
providing significant contacts with many states.
North Carolina has neither adopted the single publication rule33 nor
wrestled with the choice of law problem in multi-state torts. A recent
case, Putnam v. Triangle Publications Co.,34 seemed to present the
problem in its basic facts, but the case was dismissed on procedural
grounds and the question was not expressly reached. However, in dis-
cussing one issue, the court made a statement that could affect North
Carolina's position in this area. Suit was brought against a Pennsyl-
vania corporaion for an alleged libel3 5 which was circulated in defendant's
. ARiz. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2001 to -2005 (Supp. 1954) (Arizona) ; WEsT's ANN.
CIv. CODE §§ 3425.1 to .5 (1955) (California); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-702 to
-705 (Supp. 1955) (Idaho) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-27-30 to -34. (Supp. 1955)
(New Mexico); N. D. REv. CoDE §§ 14-0210 to -0214 (Supp. 1953) (North
Dakota) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 2090.1 to .5 (Purdon Supp. 1954) (Pennsyl-
vania) ; see 9 A. U. L. A. (Supp. 1956) for a text of the act.
" Notes, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 310, 317 (1953) ; 35 VA. L. REV. 627, 638 (1949);
60 HARv. L. Rrv. 941, 951 (1947).
" See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
" Such legislation could be supported under the commerce clause, U. S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3; or under the power to regulate the mails, U. S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 7. See Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 627, 639 (1949).
" See Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 271 (1949).
1'245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957).
" There was also alleged a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The same
problems encountered in suits for libel are also encountered in suits for invasion
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
magazines in North Carolina. The plaintiff served process on defendant
by publication pursuant to the statute allowing such service on a corpora-
tion for, among other things, any cause of action arising "out of any
tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated activity or
single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance."30°
One of the questions presented was the validity of service under this
provison.37 In the course of the decision, the court stated: "We agree
with the conclusion of the judge below that plaintiff's cause of action did
not arise out of any tortious conduct of the defendant in this state.13 8
There are two possible explanations which might justify the court's
summary dismissal of the tort issue. Both theories were argued in the
defendant's brief. (1) Assuming a tort consists of two phases, conduct
and harm, the two could well occur in different jurisdictions. So, if the
statute is interpreted literally, there would be no tortious conduct within
the state even though there was a tort committed in the state under the
normal conflict of laws rules. (2) It could be argued simply that no tort
had been committed in North Carolina. A state can decide as a part of
its law of conflict of laws that when a libel is printed in a foreign state
there is no local tort committed because each state can determine whether
or not an act is an actionable wrong within its borders.3 0 Thus if in the
Putnam case the court intended to imply that no tort was committed in
North Carolina, it would be a valid exercise of power; however, it would
destroy the traditional rule declared in the Brunswick case and followed
by the Restatement. Aside from any question of the desirability of over-
ruling this long-standing multiple publication doctrine, it is believed that
if the court did in fact decide on the basis of the defendant's second argu-
ment it should have elaborated on its reasoning so as to inform the public
of the significance of the decision.
If the plaintiff should now sue in Pennsylvania where he can get per-
sonal service of process, he might be jeopardized by the ambiguous word-
ing of the principal case. For example, assume plaintiff is known only
in North Carolina, and, consequently has his reputation injured only in
of privacy and unfair competition. See Notes, 32 MINN. L. REV. 934 (1948) ; 60
HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1947) for a discussion of these.
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (4) (Supp. 1955). The attempted service
was also made pursuant to the provisions of §§ 55-38.1 (a) (1) through (3), and
the major portion of the opinion was devoted to these other parts of the statute.
However, for the purposes of this discussion, only the subsection (4) relating to
tortious conduct will be considered.
" For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of this subsection, see Note, 35
N. C. L. REv. 546 (1957).8 Putnam v. Triangle Publications Co., 245 N. C. 432, 443, 96 S. E. 2d 445, 454
(1957).
"See 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws § 182, n. 4 (1937). In support of this




North Carolina. Should the Pennsylvania courts construe the principal
case as deciding that no tort was committed in North Carolina, plain-
tiff might be in the unenviable postion of having been definitely injured
without a right of redress. This is because a cause of action, if any, must
arise at the place of injury and not at the place where the act or omission
which caused the injury occurred.40  North Carolina being the place
of injury, and no cause of action arising in North Carolina, plaintiff
would have no right to recover. Of course the result is absurd, but it is
within the realm of possibility. Moreover, several North Carolina
cases4 ' in the area of defamation and negligence have previously inti-
mated that the tort occurred as of the time of the act or omission rather
than at the time of the injury. In Powers v. Planters National Bank
and Trust Co.,42 the court said: "It is well settled in an action for dam-
ages, resulting from negligent breach of duty, the statute of limitations
begins to run from the breach, from the wrongful act or omission com-
plained of without regard to the time when the harmful consequences
were discovered." 43  While this pertains to the statute of limitations,
the implication is that the tort occurred at the time of the act.
Whatever the actual basis of the decision on this tort issue, the court
did refrain from any open discussion of the question of multi-state
defamation just as so many other courts have done. In view of the
constitutional issues presented, it was probably not an ideal case for
treatment of the defamation aspect. It is hoped that when such a case
does arise, the court will devise a working formula.
HAmLIN WADE.
Libel and Slander-Immunity of Counsel for Defamatory Matter
Published in a Judicial Proceeding
In Wall v. Blalock,' the Supreme Court of North Carolina was con-
fronted with a problem not often presented to the Court.2 The defendant,
'0 Smyth Sales, Inc. v. Petroleum Heat and Power Co., 128 F. 2d 697 (3d Cir.
1942) ; Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 Atl. 775 (1936) ; 86 C. J. S., Torts § 24
(1954).
"Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N. C. 510, 73 S. E. 2d 320 (1952) ; Powers v. Planters
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 219 N. C. 254, 13 S. E. 2d 431 (1941) ; Bank of Spruce
Pine v. McKinney, 209 N. C. 668, 184 S. E. 506 (1936) ; Gordon v. Fredle, 206
N. C. 734, 175 S. E. 126 (1934) ; State v. Grizzard, 117 N. C. 105, 23 S. E. 93
(1895).
'2219 N. C. 254, 13 S. E. 2d 431 (1941).
48 Id. at 256, 13 S. E. 2d at 432.
' 245 N. C. 232, 95 S. E. 2d 450 (1956).
For North Carolina cases dealing generally with this problem see, Scott v.
Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146 (1954) ; Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N. C. 468,
80 S. E. 2d 248 (1954); Perry v. Perry, 153 N. C. 266, 69 S. E. 130 (1910);
Taylor v. Huff, 130 N. C. 595, 41 S. E. 873 (1902) ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C.
270, 13 S. E. 775 (1891); Nissen v. Cramer, 104 N. C. 574, 10 S. E. 270 (1889);
Shelfer v. Gooding, 47 N. C. 175 (1855) ; Biggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C. 377 (1851).
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